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1. Introduction
Breeders artificially select animal traits by manipulating the animals’ DNA, interactions with
other animals (e.g., mating, artificial insemination), and environment (e.g., diet, healthcare). In
so doing, the breeders create animal phenotypes (traits) that they deem desirable. The evolution
of the animals is relatively quick, brought about as it is, not by natural selection, but by artificial
selection. Metaphorically, the leaders of terrorist organizations and the architects of genocide
seek to “breed” certain types of social outcomes by artificially manipulating peoples’ interactions
with each other and the environments (perceptions of history, culture, etc.) in which they live.
The social outcomes that the violence entrepreneurs seek to engineer are those that advance their
tactical and strategic objectives. For example, at the time of this writing, the Islamic State (IS)
(formerly known as the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria or ISIS) has unleashed brutalities on
civilians in parts of Syria and Iraq including mass executions, torture, and beheadings. Such
ruthless actions are often on public display, which serves to intimidate people into supporting, or
not resisting, IS’ rapid conquest and control of territory. Those who seek to instill peace also
seek to engineer social outcomes. Strategic interactions between violence entrepreneurs and
third-party violence preventers occur in the context of a malleable and dynamic social context in
which the people within such systems also act according to their interests. Given the metaphor
between animal breeding and social system breeding, much of the mathematical machinery of
evolutionary theory can be adapted to the study of the social evolution of violence and peace. In
this article, we take selected aspects of evolutionary game theory dynamics to model how
terrorist leaders and genocide architects can artificially manipulate a social environment to
advance their objectives of isolating and destroying people from an out-group. We apply
evolutionary mathematics to social evolution as distinct from biological evolution.
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The article has three objectives. First, we use evolutionary game theory to identify the
characteristics of a society that make it vulnerable to a conquest from within by atrocity
entrepreneurs (section 2). Under certain conditions, atrocity entrepreneurs can create the social
metamorphosis of a peaceful people group into one that accepts or does not resist aggression
against an out-group, which we call the “social evolution of aggression.” Second, we extend the
analysis into geographic space by modeling interactions among peaceful and aggressive
phenotypes in two types of geographic areas: Moore and von Neumann (section 3). Third, we
analyze policy interventions in which the social evolution of aggression never gets started or
comes to a halt if already underway (section 4). We conclude with ideas for future research on
modeling the social evolution of aggression and a summary of key results (section 5).1

2. Evolutionary Game Theory Model of the Social Evolution of Aggression
We take as given a terrorist organization’s or genocide regime’s objective to intentionally target
civilians for destruction. Outside of weapons of mass destruction, atrocity entrepreneurs cannot
pull off large-scale civilian killings on their own. Hence, they need to enlist and train a relatively
large number of “willing executioners,” which in turn requires social settings (communities)

1

Evolutionary game theory models that encompass conflict and cooperation can be found in most game theory
textbooks as well as in textbooks in biology that contain mathematical methods (e.g., Harrington 2008, Dixit et al.
2013, and Nowak 2006). Most evolutionary games in such textbooks assume that agents are genetically predisposed
to display certain traits and that various traits are favored or disfavored over time and correspondingly increase or
decrease in the population over many generations. Applications of evolutionary methods in the specific contexts of
terrorism and genocide with a focus on social evolution are relatively scarce in the defense and peace economics
literature. Two important social evolutionary contributions in the terrorism literature, however, are Arce and
Sandler (2003, 2009), who model dynamic social interactions between fundamentalists and non-fundamentalists
within a population. Arce and Sandler identify conditions within the models in which non-fundamentalists fake the
fundamentalist phenotype in order to do well within a fundamentalist-dominated group. The models also reveal
conditions in which non-fundamentalists who are unable or unwilling to fake the fundamentalist trait can be weeded
out of the population. Citation here uses evolutionary game theory to model the social evolution of phenotypes
within a village that could either support or resist the aims of genocidal architects. He identifies conditions in which
the social evolution between hardliners, bystanders, and resisters tilts in favor of genocide resistance, but also
conditions in which the village socially evolves to support the aims of the genocide architects. This article extends
citation here’s work by considering a wider range of parameter possibilities in the space-less model (but with only
two rather than three phenotypes) and by evaluating the implications of social evolution across geographic space.
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wherein such recruitment and training can succeed (Goldhagen 1996). The focus of the model
that follows is upon such social environments. Using evolutionary game theory, we model the
conditions that give rise to atrocity-supporting social environments and how the entrepreneurs of
violence can attempt to “socially engineer” such communities.
2.1. Stage Game and Fitness Equations
Imagine a village of 10,000 people. Assume an authority group seeks to perpetrate atrocity
against an out-group and would like the village to be supportive of its aggressive aims. Assume
the potentially targeted out-group encompasses people who are not part of the 10,000 in the
village. Some villagers may already have a latent desire for aggression against the out-group;
say there are 1,000 such people (10 percent). Assume the other 9,000 (90 percent) would resist
aggression against the out-group under current social conditions. As the village is characterized
now, it would not be useful to the atrocity architects in perpetrating aggression against an outgroup. But can the authority group engineer a social metamorphosis of the village such that it
becomes supportive of or not resistant to their aims? Can the turning be accomplished relatively
easily? Under certain conditions to be identified, the answer to each question is “yes.”
Assume each person in the village has one of two dispositions toward people from the
out-group: peaceful (P) and aggressive (A). The villagers are not genetically hardwired to one
disposition or the other; people have free will, so each is free to choose the trait that s/he prefers.
Humans are social creatures, so there is a lot of interaction among the people in the village dayby-day. People work with others, buy and sell in the marketplace with others, attend charitable
causes and political rallies with others, and recreate with others (e.g., sporting events, picnics,
etc.). Assume the game matrix in Figure 1 represents the payoffs to two individuals, Bob (the
row player) and Sally (the column player), who interact in the village. Assume that Bob and
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Sally each choose the aggressive trait (A) and they socially interact over coffee. Based on Figure
1, their interaction leads to payoff a for each person. If both display the peaceful (P) trait, each
would receive payoff d from their encounter. If Bob is peaceful and Sally aggressive, Bob would
receive c and Sally b as shown in the lower left cell of the matrix. The obverse interaction is
shown in the upper right cell in which Bob receives b and Sally c.
Figure 1 here
In evolutionary game theory, Figure 1 is the “stage game.” It is the matrix that governs
the payoffs to individuals in all pairwise social interactions in the village. The payoffs reflect the
history, culture, language, and interpersonal norms of people in the village. Although highly
simplified, the matrix in Figure 1 is a type of “social genome” for the village. Other villages will
have different social genomes and more complex genomes can be represented by more complex
stage games. Our village’s genome will determine its traits or phenotypes, i.e., the number of
people that are aggressive (A) and peaceful (P) toward an out-group. Moreover, the atrocity
entrepreneurs can attempt to engineer the traits of people in the village so that a greater number
adopt aggressiveness. In short, the social genome is amenable to manipulation.
In social evolutionary terms, the traits of people – peaceful (P) and aggressive (A) – can
be thought of as strategies that they display in their social interactions with others. Assume for
simplicity that people cannot play a mixed strategy in which they choose P or A with a random
device. Assume two people are randomly drawn from the village and paired with one another.
The pairing represents a social encounter in the village and the payoff to each individual in the
pair is governed by Figure 1. Many such social encounters occur in the village throughout the
day and we can construct the expected payoff for each strategy from such an encounter. Let N
represent the number of people in the village (say N=10,000) and nA the number who initially
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choose the aggressive trait (say nA=1,000). It follows that the number of people in the village
initially choosing peacefulness, nP, is equal to N-nA (nP=9,000). Given these initial conditions
and assuming an individual can be randomly paired with itself (self-play), the probability that a
randomly drawn individual from the village would be paired with an aggressive type is (
and with a peaceful type is [(

)⁄ ]

(

⁄ )

⁄ ).2

Based on Figure 1 and our foregoing assumptions, the expected payoff to a villager who
adopts the aggressive strategy, FA, in a random pairwise social encounter is:
( )

(

( )

)

(

)

,

where rA is the ratio of the number of A-types to the total number in the village (

(1)
⁄ ).

The expected payoff to a villager adopting peace, FP, in a random pairwise social encounter is:
( )

(

( )

)

(

)

.

(2)

In evolutionary game theory, FA and FP are the respective “fitness” of the A and P traits in the
village. If aggressiveness is rewarded through, say, advancement in the atrocity leaders
organization, self-preservation, family preservation, or loot, then the A trait would be relatively
fit. If, however, aggressiveness is shunned and the peaceful trait is held in high esteem, then the
P strategy would be relatively fit. Equations (1) and (2) show that each strategy’s fitness
depends on the proportion of the villagers playing each strategy and the payoffs generated from
the various pair-wise social encounters. The average fitness in the village, ̅ , is:
̅

( )

(

)

( )

(

)

,

(3)

where Fi (i=A, P) are given in equations (1) and (2).

2

Self-play is an assumption that simplifies the probability calculations for random draws without substantially
affecting results. Specifically, without self-play, the probability that an A-type individual would be paired in a
) ⁄(
)] and with a P-type [(
) ⁄(
)]. Self-play allows
random draw with another A-type is [(
)⁄ ], respectively.
us to treat these probabilities as ( ⁄ ) and [(

6
2.2. Replicator Dynamics and Evolutionary Stable Strategy (ESS)
In social environments, humans look around and learn from the behavior of others. They
observe which traits are rewarded and which are penalized and they tend to choose or mimic
traits that are successful. In certain atrocity contexts, people who refuse to support aggression
toward an out-group (and thus adopt peacefulness in our model) can be subject to dire penalties
including incarceration or execution. In this way, such people are “weeded out.”3 Others may
act “as if” they support aggression to save their lives or careers or the lives of family members
and friends. In our model we treat such people as adopting the aggressive trait.4 It is important
to keep in mind in the analyses that follow that the fitness of traits, specifically, the incentives
people have to adopt fitter traits and shun less fit traits, drives social evolution in the village.
The replicator dynamics in evolutionary game theory are equations that describe how
fitter strategies are adopted and less fit strategies fall out of favor over time. Following Nowak
(2006), the replicator dynamic in the village is governed by the following difference equation:
(
where

̅) ,

(4)

is the number of A-types in the village at time j (j=t+1, t) and FA and ̅ are given by

equations (1) and (3), respectively. We could present the replicator equation for nP, but since
nP=N-nA and N is fixed, equation (4) also describes changes in nP over time. Note in equation (4)
that if

̅ , aggression (A) will be fitter than average and thus fitter than peacefulness (P). As

such, the number of people adopting aggression will rise over time and the number displaying
peacefulness will decline. It is this dynamic the atrocity entrepreneurs wish to generate. To

3

4

In this article we do not model the weeding out of resisters from the population.

A model with more than two phenotypes could treat feigning aggressiveness as a third phenotype as in Arce and
Sandler (2009). In order to compare and contrast our space-less analyses in this section with social evolution over
geographic space in the next section, we assume two phenotypes.
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complete the replicator dynamics, let the initial number of villagers adopting aggression be
and peacefulness

. In the numerical example earlier,

=1,000 and

=9,000.

Based on the payoff values a, b, c, and d in the stage game in Figure 1 and assuming no
payoff ties for a and c as well as for b and d, there are four possible cases in which the ratio of
aggressive types, rA, is determined as summarized in Table 1 (Nowak 2006, p. 50).5 In Case 1,
the payoffs to aggressive types are low relative to the corresponding payoffs to peaceful types:
a<c and b<d. Case 1 depicts a simplified “social genome” in which the village’s history, culture,
religion and so forth imply that aggressiveness is unrewarded relative to peacefulness in pairwise
social encounters. For Case 2, a<c and b>d. Now the payoff for an aggressive type in a “cross
encounter” with a peaceful type is more rewarding to the aggressor relative to what s/he would
have achieved had s/he been peaceful (b>d). In Case 3, a>c and b<d. Relative to Case 1, the
payoff to an aggressive type in a “same encounter” with an aggressive type is more rewarding to
the aggressor relative to what s/he would have achieved had s/he been peaceful (a>c). Finally,
in Case 4, a>c and b>d. Here the “social genome” implies that the aggressive trait is rewarded
relative to peacefulness in pairwise encounters. Such a society would be one in which
compliance with the atrocity entrepreneurs would lead to survival, career advancement, and/or
material rewards while non-compliance would correspond to the absence of such benefits.
Table 1 here
Figure 2 shows four social evolutionary outcomes that can arise in the model based on
the four cases in Table 1. Each panel plots the fitness equations (1) and (2) over the ratio
adopting the aggressive strategy, rA, under the parameter assumptions of the four cases.6 For
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6

No payoff ties for a and c and for b and d eliminates special cases that are not essential to the article’s main points.

Figure 2 and the simulations in this article assume that parameter values are not negative, but this is not necessary.
For example, if peaceful types are harmed in interactions with aggressive types, c would be negative.
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Case 1 (a<c and b<d) the upper left panel of Figure 2 shows that peace is fitter than aggression
(FP>FA) for any possible ratio of the population adopting aggression. By equations (3) and (4),
any temporarily present aggressive types will be less fit than peaceful types, leading to a decline
in the number and ratio of individuals displaying aggression. In Case 1, the equilibrium outcome
is

as shown in the top left panel of Figure 2, which is an evolutionary stable strategy

(ESS) because any mutation toward aggression by some in the village will remain less fit than
peacefulness. Moreover, if the atrocity entrepreneurs sent aggressive types into the village from
the outside in an effort to turn the villagers toward aggression, such an invasion would be
ineffective in turning the villagers to aggression given the payoff parameter assumptions of Case
1.7 In Case 1, peace dominates and the village cannot be turned.
When moving from Case 1 to 2 in Figure 2 (see lower left panel), we increase b and/or
decrease d. In Figure 1, such parameter changes represent higher payoffs for A-types in cross
encounters and/or lower payoffs for P-types in same encounters, which tilts the outcome away
from the dominance of peace in Case 1 to coexistence of peaceful and aggressive types in Case
2. We now have equalized fitness (expected payoffs) at

(

)⁄(

) in the

lower left panel, which is an ESS because any temporary change in rA above or below
aggression being less or more fit than peace, causing rA to move back toward

leads to

. Moreover, if

the atrocity entrepreneurs send aggressive types into the village from the outside in an effort to
turn it toward aggression, this would temporarily increase rA, but it would not increase

. Thus,

such a policy would not alter the coexistence outcome given the parameter values of Case 2.
When moving from Case 1 to 3 in Figure 2 (see upper right panel), we increase a and/or
decrease c. In Figure 1, such parameter changes represent an increase in payoffs for A-types in
7

The invasion of aggressors would increase the number and ratio of aggressive types,
village’s population, N.

and

, and increase the
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same encounters and/or a decrease in payoffs for P-types in cross encounters. This tilts the
outcome away from the dominance of peace in Case 1 to a bi-stable situation in Case 3. We now
(

have equalized fitness (expected payoffs) at

)⁄(

) in the upper

right panel. Such an outcome is not an ESS because any temporary increase in rA above or
below

would lead to aggression being more or less fit than peacefulness, causing a

change in rA toward an extreme outcome. Specifically, if there is a sufficiently large number and
thus ratio of aggressive types in the population such that

, then aggression will be

fitter than peacefulness and rA will grow toward

, which is an ESS. Alternatively, if the

village contains enough peaceful types such that

, then peacefulness will be fitter

than aggression and rA will decline toward

, which is also an ESS. Case 3 shows that the

initial ratio of aggressive types is critically important in determining whether the village’s social
evolution is toward atrocity-supporting aggression or atrocity-resisting peace. If the initial ratio
rA is just below

, social evolution will increasingly reward the peaceful trait (as more

villagers adopt peacefulness) until only peacefulness is displayed in the village (
suppose from the starting point in which

is just below

). But

the atrocity entrepreneurs bring

in a small number of aggressive types from the outside such that the initial rA is just above
. Now social evolution will increasingly reward the aggressive trait over time until the
whole village displays aggressiveness (
is close to

). Case 3 shows that when the initial proportion rA

, a small invasion of aggressive types promoted by the atrocity entrepreneurs

can have a dramatic effect in tipping the village away from what would have been the social
evolution of peace to the social evolution of aggression. The Case 3 village can be turned.
When moving from Case 1 to Case 4 in Figure 2 (see lower right panel), we increase a
and/or decrease c and increase b and/or decrease d. In reference to Figure 1, each of these
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parameter changes favors the fitness of aggressive relative to peaceful phenotypes. For Case 4
we see in the lower right panel that aggression is fitter than peace (FA>FP) for any possible ratio
of the population adopting the aggressive trait. By equations (3) and (4), any temporarily present
peaceful types will be less fit than aggressive types, thus leading to a decline in the number and
ratio of individuals displaying the peaceful trait. In Case 4, the equilibrium outcome is

,

which is an ESS. Note also that there is no need for the atrocity entrepreneurs to send aggressive
types into the village to foster the social evolution of aggression because the village is already
(and persistently) turned. In Case 4, aggression dominates peace.
Figure 2 here
2.3. A Numerical Example: Engineering the Social Evolution of Aggression
As a numerical example of how an atrocity entrepreneur can engineer a social outcome that
supports aggression against an out-group, assume parameter values consistent with a Case 3 bistable outcome: a=2, b=1.5, c=1, d=2, and

(20 percent). Panel (a) of Figure 3 plots

the fitness equations (1) and (2) for these parameters and shows that

. Since

, peacefulness is more rewarding (fitter) than aggressiveness, leading more people
to choose peacefulness over time according to replicator equation (4). Hence, rA declines over
time in panel (a) until arriving at the ESS in which all villagers adopt peacefulness (
Suppose from the panel (a) starting point of

in Figure 3, the atrocity

entrepreneurs insert enough aggressive types from the outside that

rises to 0.25. Such a

policy alone is insufficient to turn the social evolution away from peace because
less than

).

is

. But suppose the invasion is coupled with policies that increase

payoffs in aggressive/aggressive encounters and reduce payoffs in peaceful/peaceful encounters.
Specifically, assume a rises from 2 to 2.2 and d falls from 2 to 1.8. As shown in panel (b) of
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Figure 3, the relatively small changes in a and d (10 percent each) cause
Coupled with the relatively small increase in

to 0.25 from the invasion,

to fall to 0.20.
is now greater than

. Hence, in panel (b), the aggressive trait is more rewarding (fitter) than peacefulness,
leading more people to choose aggressiveness over time according to replicator equation (4). As
such, rA increases over time in panel (b) until arriving at the ESS in which all villagers are
aggressive types (

).

Figure 3 here
2.4. The Nazi Example: Engineering the Social Evolution of Aggression in Occupied Europe
The payoffs a, b, c, and d in the stage game in Figure 1 are the outcomes from social interactions
in the village, which are rooted in the village’s history, customs, and institutions. The payoffs
can be thought of as the village’s genomic endowment or heritage. We do not model the origins
of the payoffs, but take them as given. In villages influenced or controlled by terrorist groups
and genocide architects, the social genome is subject to “social engineering” in which the
violence entrepreneurs attempt to foster a social metamorphosis to aggression. Our previous
analyses, summarized in Table 1 and Figure 2, show that increases in a and b and decreases in c
and d move the village from Case 1 in which peace dominates toward Case 4 in which
aggression dominates. In moving toward Case 4, the intermediate Case 3 (with high a and low
c) could also be amenable to the social evolution of aggression provided a sufficiently large
invasion of aggressors came into the village (see Figure 3). Hence, the violence entrepreneurs
would like to increase a and b, decrease c and d, and/or insert an outside gang of aggressors into
the village. What do these constructs represent in a real-world setting of potential social
evolution of aggression? We address this question by presenting selected social evolutionary
techniques deployed by the Nazis in the occupied territories of Europe during World War II.
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In the foundational book in the field of genocide studies, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe,
Raphael Lemkin (1944, p. xi and 79) described genocide as a “synchronized attack” designed to
destroy the existence of a victim group and replace it with the national pattern of the oppressor.
Lemkin (1944, pp. xiii-xiv) identified eight dimensions or “fields” of group destruction:
[I]n the political field (by destroying institutions of self-government and imposing
a German pattern of administration, and through colonization by Germans); in the
social field (by disrupting the social cohesion of the nation involved and killing or
removing elements such as the intelligentsia, which provide spiritual
leadership…); in the cultural field (by prohibiting or destroying cultural
institutions and cultural activities; by substituting vocational education for
education in the liberal arts, in order to prevent humanistic thinking…); in the
economic field (by shifting wealth to Germans and by prohibiting the exercise of
trades and occupations by people who do not promote Germanism “without
reservations”); in the biological field (by a policy of depopulation and by
promoting procreation by Germans in occupied countries); in the field of physical
existence (by introducing a starvation rationing system for non-Germans and by
mass killings, mainly Jews, Poles, Slovenes, and Russians); in the religious field
(by interfering with the activities of the Church, which in many countries provides
not only spiritual but national leadership); in the field of morality (by attempts to
create an atmosphere of moral debasement through promoting pornographic
publications and motion pictures, and the excessive consumption of alcohol).
What occurred in each of these eight fields was a social advancement of people who supported or
did not resist the Nazi Program and a social degradation of those who did resist. In the context
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of the simplified social genome in Figure 1, the Nazis implemented policies that increased
payoffs to supporters of aggression when aggressive phenotypes interacted (increase a) and
aggressive and peaceful types interacted (increase b). On the flip side, peaceful types were
harmed through policies that decreased payoffs to supporters of peace when peaceful and
aggressive types interacted (decrease c) and peaceful types interacted (decrease d). Furthermore,
the Nazis implemented invasions of aggressive types into locales to foster the social evolution of
aggression. Table 2 presents selected Nazi techniques that promoted the social evolution of
aggression categorized according to the parameters of the evolutionary game model.
Table 2 here

3. The Social Evolution of Aggression Over Geographic Space
In this section we extend the evolutionary game model of section 2 into geographic space.
Specifically, we model how the social evolution of aggression plays out over time and over a
village’s area. The introduction of geographic space into the analysis shows, among other
things, that atrocity entrepreneurs can use geography to accomplish their objectives even under
conditions that are not generally supportive of the social evolution of aggression.
3.1. Payoffs from Social Encounters in a Moore Neighborhood
Following Nowak (2006, Ch. 9), assume each individual in the village is situated on a twodimensional square lattice in which it socially interacts with each of its immediate neighbors. In
each time period, each individual receives a payoff based on its interactions with the various
neighbors. Moreover, each individual observes the payoffs accruing to each neighbor and then
adopts in the next period the trait or strategy yielding the highest payoff in the neighborhood.
Figure 4 is an example of such characteristics and is known as a Moore neighborhood. In panel
(a) of Figure 4, assume Sally (in the middle of the lattice) initially selects the peacefulness trait

14
(P) and her eight immediate neighbors in the lattice also choose peacefulness. According to the
stage game in Figure 1, the payoff to a peaceful individual in a social encounter with another
peaceful type is d. In panel (a) of Figure 4, Sally socially interacts with eight peaceful types in
her neighborhood, so she receives a payoff of 8d. Assuming that there is not a higher payoff
than 8d in Sally’s neighborhood, she will choose peacefulness in the next period, otherwise she
will switch to the aggressive trait. Panel (b) of Figure 4 presents a different situation for Sally.
Notice that she is now surrounded by five aggressive and three peaceful neighbors. Based on the
stage game of Figure 1, Sally receives a payoff of c from each of the five encounters with an
aggressive neighbor and d from each of the three encounters with a peaceful neighbor. Hence,
her payoff from the eight encounters in panel (b) is 5c+3d. If we are in a case in which c and d
are low relative to a and b, respectively, then some of Sally’s aggressive-displaying neighbors
will have a greater payoff than Sally. In the next round, Sally will have an incentive to switch to
the aggressive trait (perhaps for sake of self-preservation, career advancement, etc.).8
Figure 4 here
3.2. Social Evolution of Aggression in a Moore Neighborhood
Here we present several dynamic and spatial simulations of the social evolution of aggression to
demonstrate how an atrocity entrepreneur can engineer outcomes that promote the social
acceptance of aggression toward an out-group. We begin with parameter values that align with
Case 2 in Table 1 and Figure 2 (i.e., a<c and b>d) analyzed earlier in which there was a
coexistence outcome. Although we tether the spatial model here to parameters associated with
the space-less model of section 2, Moore neighborhood social encounters and payoff generations

8

Although the boundaries of the lattices in Figure 4 would appear to imply that individuals on the edges do not have
eight neighbors, simulations of spatial evolution in a Moore neighborhood can wrap such edges around the square to
generate a torus. Toroidal geometry implies that each cell in the grid is equivalent to each other cell and each
individual has eight neighbors (Nowak 2006, p. 148).
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are not the same as the random pairwise encounters of the space-less model. Hence, the results
of the space-less and Moore neighborhood models will differ.
Assume a=1, c=2, b=1.5, and d=1 in the stage game of Figure 1 and the initial proportion
of aggressors is

. Assume the village is made up of 10,000 people (N=10,000). Based

on simulation techniques available from EvoLudo, panel (a) of Figure 5 shows a 100x100 square
lattice in which 20 percent of the village’s inhabitants are initially aggressive types (shown by
the red cells) and 80 percent are peaceful types (shown by the blue cells) (see evoludo.org ). The
initial distribution of types is randomly assigned across space by EvoLudo. Panel (b) of Figure 5
shows the period 25 result of the social evolution of phenotypes in the Moore village. The blue
cells represent peaceful types who were peaceful in the previous period and the red cells
aggressive types who were aggressive in the previous period. The green cells show peaceful
types who were aggressive in the previous period. The yellow cells show aggressive types who
were peaceful in the previous period. Figure 5 shows the social evolution to a coexistence
outcome in which the proportion of people adopting the aggressive trait will oscillate between
about 27 and 41 percent even out to thousands of periods. Particular individuals in the village
will switch their strategies over time, depending on relative fitness in sub-neighborhoods, but the
proportionate outcome remains in the range of about 27 to 41 percent aggressiveness.
Figure 5 here
Assume now that a=2, c=1, b=1, and d=2 in the stage game of Figure 1 and the initial
proportion of aggressors is

. These parameter values correspond to Case 3 in Table 1

and Figure 2 in the space-less model in which there was a bi-stable outcome. Panel (a) of the
previous figure (Figure 5) represents EvoLudo’s random distribution of the initial 20 percent
aggressive types in the village. Panel (a) of Figure 6 shows a quick social evolution to peace in
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the village by period 2 under our new parameters (

). From panel (a), assume the atrocity

entrepreneurs are able to increase the payoff in aggressive/aggressive encounters by 25 percent
from a=2 to a=2.5. Panel (b) shows the implications of the parameter change in the village at
period 75. Permanent blocks (sub-neighborhoods) of aggressive types emerge in the village
encompassing about 2.8 percent of the population. This may seem relatively benign, but the
village is close to a tipping point in which it could evolve to complete aggression. In panel (c) of
Figure 6, we go back to the initial conditions of c=1, b=1, d=2, and

, but we increase

parameter a just a bit more to 2.7. By period 10, aggression has seriously metastasized in the
village. By period 23, the village has socially evolved to complete aggression (not shown). 9
Manipulating a is not the only social genomic tool available to atrocity entrepreneurs;
parameters b, c, and d can also be manipulated. Assume now that a is back to the value of 2.5 in
which blocks of aggressive types occur for 2.8 percent of the population as in panel (b) of Figure
6. Let b increase by 20 percent from 1 to 1.2 and c fall by 20 percent from 1 to 0.8. Parameter b
is the payoff to an aggressive type in a cross encounter with a peaceful type and c is the payoff to
a peaceful type in a cross encounter with an aggressive type. These parameter changes tilt the
game in favor of aggressors and against peaceful types in cross encounters, everything else the
same. Begin from EvoLudo’s random distribution of the initial 20 percent aggressive types in
the village, such as panel (a) in Figure 5 above. In panel (d) of Figure 6, numerous
concentrations of aggressive types socially evolve by period 5. By period 18, the whole village
socially evolves to the aggressive phenotype such that

(not shown). Figure 6 shows how

relatively easy it is for atrocity entrepreneurs to put the village on the path toward the social
evolution of complete aggression. All that was required was a 35 percent favorable change in

9

The time period of convergence and, for some parameter sets, the proportion of phenotypes that persist over time,
depend on EvoLudo’s random spatial distribution of initial phenotypes.
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payoffs to aggressive types in same encounters (increase a from 2 to 2.7) or a 25 percent
favorable change in same encounters (increase a from 2 to 2.5) coupled with a 20 percent
favorable change in cross encounters (increase b from 1 to 1.2 and decrease c from 1 to 0.8).
Figure 6 here
3.3. Payoffs from Social Encounters in a von Neumann Neighborhood
In a von Neumann neighborhood, each player interacts with its four nearest neighbors to the
north, south, east, and west and does not interact with its diagonal neighbors. In panel (a) of
Figure 4 above, Sally would only interact with neighbors 2, 4, 6, and 8 in a von Neumann
neighborhood and thus receive a payoff of 4d. In panel (b) of Figure 4, Sally’s von Neumann
neighborhood payoff would be 2c+2d. Just like the Moore neighborhood, we assume here that
each individual observes the payoffs accruing to each neighbor and then adopts in the next
period the trait yielding the highest payoff in the neighborhood.
3.4. Social Evolution of Aggression in a von Neumann Neighborhood
Social evolutionary behaviors in von Neumann relative to Moore neighborhoods can be quite
different as demonstrated in Figure 7. In panel (a) we have a=2, b=1, c=1, d=2, and
and EvoLudo randomly distributes the 20 percent red cells across the population such as shown
earlier in panel (a) of Figure 5. Recall that for these parameter values in a Moore neighborhood,
social evolution quickly converged to complete peacefulness by period 2 (see panel (a) of Figure
6). For the von Neumann neighborhood, however, pockets of aggressors persist in the village
encompassing about 2.1 percent of the population by period 10 as shown in panel (a) of Figure 7.
Even out to thousands of periods, blocks of aggressive types persist in the von Neumann
neighborhood (not shown). Generally, von Neumann geography is more beneficial to aggressive
types than Moore geography for equivalent parameter values. For example, in panel (b) of

18
Figure 7 we show the social evolution in a Moore village assuming a=2.4, b=1.2, c=0.8, d=2, and
. As panel (b) shows, blocks of aggressive types persist in the Moore village even out
to time period 1,000. In the less dense interactions of a von Neumann relative to a Moore
neighborhood (4 neighbors rather than 8), however, the same parameter values that converged to
a few isolated blocks of aggressive types in the Moore village socially evolves toward complete
aggression in the von Neumann village as shown in panel (c). Shown in that panel is the social
evolution of aggression at period 100. By period 115, the social evolution is complete and the
whole village is made up of aggressive phenotypes (not shown).10
Atrocity entrepreneurs can also engineer sub-neighborhoods of aggressors as shown in
panel (d) of Figure 7 assuming a von Neumann village. In that panel we return to the parameter
values a=2, b=1, c=1, d=2, and

. By period 10, persistent blocks of aggressors

surrounded by much larger groups of peaceful types emerge (not shown). In the upper left
corner of panel (d), we “artificially inseminate” the village with 25 additional aggressors in a
concentrated block in a sub-neighborhood of the village. Panel (d) of Figure 7 shows the results
at period 50. The artificially created block of aggressive types persists, as do all other aggressive
blocks, even though the overall village strongly tilts toward peacefulness. Panel (d) implies that
if a particular sub-neighborhood is especially valuable to the atrocity entrepreneurs for achieving
their objectives, they can create local “success” given von Neumann relative to Moore geography
even when the overall social evolution favors peacefulness.
Figure 7 here
10

In footnote 9 we noted that the outcome of a simulation can be sensitive to EvoLudo’s initial random spatial
distribution of phenotypes. In ten Moore simulations with the parameter values of panel (b) of Figure 7, all
converged to the presence of blocks of aggressive types surrounded by mostly peaceful types as shown in panel (b).
For ten von Neumann simulations using the parameters of panel (c) of Figure 7, nine converged to complete
aggression and one converged to the presence of large blocks of aggressive types (much larger than in panel b for
the Moore village). Overall, the von Neumann village is more prone than the Moore village to the survivability and
spread of aggressive types for the simulations that we ran, everything else the same.
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4. Policy Interventions and the Social Evolution of Peace
At the most basic level, third-party interveners for peace seek to socially engineer the opposite
outcome in a village relative to the aims of the atrocity entrepreneurs. In the space-less model in
section 3, peace supporters would like a village’s “social DNA” to be such that the peaceful trait
is rewarded and aggressiveness is unrewarded in pairwise encounters. Hence, if parameters a
and b are relatively low and c and d relatively high, Case 1 emerges in Figure 2 such that peace
dominates everywhere in the village. For less sanguine parameter values, for example those
corresponding to the Case 3 bi-stable outcome in Figure 2, the initial number of peaceful types in
the village can be critically important in insuring that peace rather than aggression socially
evolves in the village. Hence, insertion of peacekeepers can be decisive in insuring peace under
certain conditions. When considering geographic space in evolutionary dynamics, additional
issues come to the fore for peacekeeping consideration, to which we now turn.
4.1. Policy Interventions for Peace in a Moore Neighborhood
Assume a=2.7, b=1, c=1, d=2, and

in a Moore village. Panel (a) of Figure 8 shows a

metastasizing lump of aggressive types by period 3. Left unchecked the lump will grow until the
whole village is of the aggressive type (not shown). In panel (b), we insert 15 peacekeepers into
the center of the lump. Panel (c) shows that the peacekeeping effort is too little too late. By
period 15, the lump has aggressively metastasized and, left unchecked, will evolve until the
whole village is aggressive (not shown). Panel (d) shows at period 3 a lump that is the same size
as that shown in panel (c). Similar to the lump in panel (a), insertion of 15 peacekeepers will be
insufficient to stem the growth of aggression (not shown). Hence, we insert 20 peacekeepers
into the lump as shown in panel (e). Panel (f) shows that by period 4 aggression is contained and
the village is made up of only peaceful types. What is striking about Figure 8 is how the fate of
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the village can hang on a “knife edge.” With 20 rather than 15 peacekeepers, complete
peacefulness is sustained in the village rather than the emergence of complete aggression.
Figure 8 here
Following Nowak (2006, pp. 159-160), we consider the role of “walkers” in creating a
“big bang” of peace. A walker is a concentrated unit of 10 peaceful types that operates in a
world of aggressive types (Nowak 2006, p. 159). In panel (a) of Figure 9, two walker teams are
inserted at time 0 into the otherwise completely aggressive Moore village under parameter
assumptions that favor peaceful types in same encounters (d=1), aggressive types even more in
cross encounters (b=1.51), but otherwise are not favorable (a=0, c=0). The village’s population
is N=4,761, so the 20 peacekeepers imply

.11 In 100 simulations not presented in this

article in which the initial proportion of aggressors was 90 percent and they were randomly
distributed in the village, social evolution always converged to complete aggression. But the
“walker intervention policy” in panel (a) leads to a decidedly different outcome. By time 6 the
walker teams are close to connecting as shown in panel (b). Panel (c) shows the early stage of a
“big bang” of peace in period 8. By time 15, the social evolution of peace continues to grow (see
panel d). Panel (e) shows that by time 60, peace has become dominant in the village and by time
150, pockets of aggressive types are relatively small and contained as shown in panel (f).
Figure 9 here
4.2. Policy Interventions for Peace in a von Neumann Neighborhood
A von Neumann village is less concentrated than a Moore village in that each individual interacts
with four neighbors rather than eight. We ran the same simulations here as in the previous subsection to compare and contrast policy interventions for peace under the two geographies.

11

N=4,761 was Nowak’s (2006) assumption in his walker analysis, which we follow here.
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Assume as above in Figure 8 that a=2.7, b=1, c=1, d=2, and

, but now we are

in a von Neumann village. In panel (a) of Figure 10, we show the emergence of persistent blocks
of aggressive types by period 3. These aggressive blocks will persist out to thousands of periods
(not shown). In panel (b), we insert one peacekeeper into the center of each of the 41 aggressive
blocks. Panel (c) shows that the peacekeeping effort is effective for those blocks that had five or
fewer aggressive types, but ineffective for blocks that had six or more aggressors. Panel (d) of
Figure 10 shows at time 3 the insertion of one peacekeeper into aggressive blocks of five or
fewer and two peacekeepers into aggressive blocks of six or more. By time 4, the whole village
socially evolves to peace (not shown). The spatial dynamics of peacekeeping in Moore relative
to von Neumann neighborhoods differ. In Moore neighborhoods, concentrations of aggressive
types can begin to socially evolve and peacekeeping efforts must be sufficiently concentrated
and substantial if aggression is to be neutralized. In von Neumann geography, however, many
scattered locales of aggressive types can persist, even under parametric conditions that overall
are supportive of peacefulness. Under such conditions, peacekeeping efforts must be sufficiently
disparate (geographically) and substantial per locale for the aggressive lumps to be eradicated.
Figure 10 here
Figure 11 shows that walker peacekeeping efforts differ under von Neumann relative to
Moore geography. In panel (a), two peaceful teams of ten are inserted at time 0 into the
otherwise completely aggressive von Neumann village under the same parameter values as in the
Moore village analyzed in Figure 9 (i.e., a=0, b=1.51, c=0, d=1, and

). The walker

intervention policy shown in panel (a) of Figure 11 is the same as that shown in panel (a) of
Figure 9, but under von Neumann geography the results are decidedly different. By time 6, the
walker teams are close to connecting as shown in panel (b) of Figure 11. Panel (c) shows by
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time 12 the emergence of, not a big bang of peace, but a “small band” of peace. Running the
simulation forward from panel (c)’s time 12 leads to no further changes. Hence, von Neumann
geography is not conducive to a big bang of peace the way Moore geography is. Moreover, the
big bang of peace under Moore geography required two concentrating teams of walkers. Under
von Neumann geography, however, each walker team has the capability of carving out its own
small band of peace as shown in panels (d)-(f) of Figure 11. In panel (d), we set the initial teams
of walkers such that they will not connect. By period 25, each team is carving out its own small
band of peace. By about period 75, the creations of the small bands of peace have come to an
end, but much of the village remains of the aggressive phenotype.
Figure 11 here

5. Conclusions
People groups are amenable to forms of social genomic engineering in which their interpersonal
interactions, perceptions of culture and history, and population mixes are manipulated to support
the aims of a small group of “social engineers.” In this article, the social engineers are the
leaders of terrorist organizations or genocide architects, who seek to socially transform people
groups away from peacefulness to an aggressive posture toward out-groups. Using evolutionary
game theory models, we analyzed population mixes and how people relate or misrelate to others
in space-less pairwise encounters and in Moore and von Neumann neighborhoods to highlight
conditions under which atrocity engineers can transform a village into supporting, or not
resisting, violence against an out-group. We also analyzed conditions under which peacemakers
could prevent the social evolution of aggression.
Future research on modeling the social evolution of aggression should consider that much
of the vast array of mathematical machinery in evolutionary biology has yet to be adapted to the
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study of the social evolution of aggression and peace. Many other neighborhood assumptions
beyond von Neumann and Moore can be considered. For example, individuals in a village could
be treated as triangular (having three direct neighbors) or pentagonal (having five direct
neighbors) and so forth such that a wide range of population densities could be modeled (three,
four, five, six direct neighbors, etc.). EvoLudo’s simulation techniques already allow very dense
neighborhoods of 24, 48, 80, and even higher levels, with results that can vary significantly from
the von Neumann (4 neighbors) and Moore (8 neighbors) geographies. Furthermore, in this
article we used “best wins equal stay” player updates and synchronous population updates.
Numerous other player and population update protocols are available in the evolutionary
literature including, for players, “best wins equal random,” “best reply,” and “Fermi update,” and
for populations, “asynchronous replication,” “birth death processes,” and “stochastic updates.”12
Moreover, there are alternative methods for modeling replicator dynamics including alternative
replicator equations, variations in the degree to which payoffs translate into fitness, potential for
sub-groups of the population to only interact with those they desire, migrations into and out of
the population (e.g., births, deaths, refugees), and stochastic elements. In addition, modeling the
spatial social evolution of aggression and peace can consider three (or more) phenotypes such as
fundamentalists, non-fundamentalists, and feigners (as in Arce and Sandler 2009) or hardliners,
bystanders, and resisters (as in citation here). Potentially important geographic elements such as
forests, mountain ranges, borders, waterways, and population density variations in subneighborhoods could also be incorporated into such models.
The key messages of our article are several. First, under a fairly wide range of
conditions, people groups can socially exist near a “knife edge” in which small social
engineering efforts toward aggression or peace can have dramatic effects. We saw in several
12

For summaries of these and other update protocols see Nowak (2006), Hauert (2002), and evoludo.org.
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simulations that a small effort to foster aggression by the atrocity entrepreneurs could tip an
otherwise peaceful village into a social metamorphosis in which the whole village comes to
support aggression. The tipping can go the other way. Relatively small but well-timed and welllocated peacekeeping efforts can neutralize the social evolution of aggression and allow peace to
persist in a village. The fate of a village can truly hang in the balance between the engineering
efforts of atrocity entrepreneurs and peacemakers. Second, geographic space really matters in
understanding the social evolution of aggression. Social evolution for highly concentrated
people in a Moore village can play out very differently over time and space relative to the less
concentrated people groupings in a von Neumann village and relative to space-less models. For
example, “walker” peacekeeping interventions in a Moore village can lead to a “big bang” of
peace, but the same conditions in a von Neumann village lead to a muted outcome for peace. We
also found that the deterministic space-less model leads to definitive outcomes whereas the
outcomes in models with geographic space can be sensitive to the initial random spatial
distribution of the population mix. Third, under conditions in which the social evolution of
aggression can metastasize within a village, early and well-located (geographically)
interventions for peace are essential to stop aggressiveness in its tracks. Fourth, any general
claims about the ability or inability of peacekeepers to prevent the social evolution of aggression
should be looked at with suspicion. Social context is immensely important for understanding
how people relate or misrelate to one another and such contexts vary widely across the world and
within states, cities, towns, rural areas, and neighborhoods. In some social settings, a small
peacekeeping effort can have dramatic effects in fostering a more peaceful social context among
people from an in-group. In other settings, the aggressive fate of the village may be sealed and
scarce peacekeeping resources might be better deployed elsewhere.
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Figure 1: Payoffs in Pairwise Encounters in the Evolutionary Game Theory Model
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Figure 2: Four Cases in the Evolutionary Game Theory Model
Case 1:
Peace Dominates for a<c and b<d
(mutant invasion ineffective)
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Figure 3: Engineering the Social Evolution of Aggression
Panel (a): Initially
 peacefulness is fitter than aggression
(FP>FA)  social evolution over time to ESS at
, which is complete peacefulness.
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Figure 4: Sally’s Spatial Interactions and Payoffs in a Moore Neighborhood
blue cell for person choosing
peacefulness (P) trait

red cell for person choosing
aggressive (A) trait

Panel (a): Sally chooses peacefulness and has 8 peaceful neighbors  Sally’s payoff =8d

Neighbor1

Neighbor2

Neighbor3

Neighbor8

Sally
payoff
=8d
Neighbor4

Neighbor7

Neighbor6

Neighbor5

Panel (b): Sally chooses peacefulness and has 5 aggressive and 3 peaceful neighbors  Sally’s
payoff =5c+3d

Neighbor1

Neighbor2

Neighbor3

Neighbor8

Sally
payoff
=5c+3d
Neighbor4

Neighbor7

Neighbor6

Neighbor5

Note:
When choosing peacefulness, Sally’s payoff from each peaceful neighbor is d and from each aggressive neighbor is
c based on the stage game in Figure 1.
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Figure 5: Social Evolution in the Moore Village (for a=1, b=1.5, c=2, d=1,
)
Panel (a): Time period 0 in which 20 percent of village is aggressive type

Panel (b): Time period 25 in which about 40 percent of the village is aggressive type
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Figure 6: Social Evolution in the Moore Village (initially for a=2, b=1, c=1, d=2,
wins equal stay, Population updates: synchronous)

, N=10,000, Player updates: best

Panel (a): Social evolution to peacefulness by period 2

Panel (c): Increase in payoff in aggressive/aggressive encounters to
a=2.7, leading to tipping point for social evolution of aggression
(period 10)

Panel (b): Increase in payoff in aggressive/aggressive
encounters to a=2.5 and convergence to 2.8%
aggressive types in blocks (period 75)

Panel (d): Social evolution to aggression for a=2.5, b=1.2, c=0.8,
d=2,
(period 5)
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Figure 7: Social Evolution in the von Neumann Village (N=10,000, Player updates: best wins equal stay, Population updates:
synchronous)
Panel (a): Blocks of aggressive types persist in von Neumann
village for a=2, b=1, c=1, d=2,
(period 10)

Panel (c): Social evolution of aggression in von Neumann village
for a=2.4, b=1.2, c=0.8, d=2,
(period 100)

Panel (b): Blocks of aggressive types persist in Moore
village for a=2.4, b=1.2, c=0.8, d=2,
(period 1,000)

Panel (d): Creation of block of aggressive types in northwest
corner of von Neumann village for a=2, b=1, c=1, d=2,
. This and other blocks persist (period 50)
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Figure 8: Peacekeeping and the Fate of the Moore Village (a=2.7, b=1, c=1, d=2,
N=10,000, Player updates: best wins equal stay, Population updates: synchronous)

,

Panel (a): Lump of aggressive types emerges
(period 3)

Panel (d): Similar period 3 lump of aggressive
types (period 3)

Panel (b) Insertion of 15 peacekeepers into
the lump (period 3)

Panel (e): Insertion of 20 peacekeepers into
the lump (period 3)

Panel (c): Peacekeepers too little too late.
Lump seriously metastasizing (period 15)

Panel (f): Aggressive lump is contained
(period 4)
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Figure 9: “Walkers” and the “Big Bang” of Peace in the Moore Village (a=0, b=1.51, c=0,
d=1,
, N=4,761, Player updates: best wins equal stay, Population updates:
synchronous)
Panel (a): 2 walker teams of 10 peaceful types
inserted at time 0

Panel (d): By time 15, the big bang of peace
continues to grow

Panel (b): By time 6, the walker teams are
close to concentrating

Panel (e): By time 60, peace is dominant

Panel (c): At time 8, the walkers connect and
the “big bang” of peace begins

Panel (f): By time 150, village is mostly
peaceful with locales of aggressive types
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Figure 10: Peacekeeping and the Fate of the von Neumann Village (a=2.7, b=1, c=1, d=2,
updates: best wins equal stay, Population updates: synchronous)

, N=10,000, Player

Panel (a): Blocks of aggressive types emerge by period 3

Panel (c): By time 10, only blocks that had 6 or more aggressive
types at time 3 persist

Panel (b): Insertion of 1 peacekeeper into each
aggressive block (period 3)

Panel (d): Insertion of 1 peacekeeper into aggressive blocks of 5 or
fewer and 2 peacekeepers into aggressive blocks of 6 or more
(period 3)
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Figure 11: “Walkers” and the “Small Band” of Peace in the von Neumann Village (a=0,
b=1.51, c=0, d=1,
, N=4,761, Player updates: best wins equal stay, Population
updates: synchronous)
Panel (a): 2 walker teams of 10 peaceful types
inserted at time 0

Panel (d): 2 non-overlapping walker teams
of 10 peaceful types inserted at time 0

Panel (b): By time 6, the walker teams are
close to concentrating

Panel (e): By time 25, each walker team
is carving out “small band” of peace

Panel (c): At time 12, the walkers connect but
a “big bang” of peace does not occur

Panel (f): By time 75, the “small bands” of
peace have spread as far as they can
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Table 1: Four Possible Cases of the Social Evolution of Aggression
1. Case 1: a<c and b<d


Parameters imply aggressiveness unrewarded relative to peacefulness in social
encounters

2. Case 2: a<c and b>d


 Peace and Aggression bistable

Parameters imply aggressors relatively well rewarded in social encounters with other
aggressors

4. Case 4: a>c and b>d


 Peace and Aggression coexist

Parameters imply aggressors relatively well rewarded in social encounters with
peaceful types

3. Case 3: a>c and b<d


 Peace dominates

 Aggression dominates

Parameters imply aggressiveness rewarded relative to peacefulness in social
encounters
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Table 2: Manipulating the Social Genome: Selected Nazi Techniques that Foster the Social
Evolution of Aggression in the 2x2 Evolutionary Game Model
1. Increase payoffs to aggressive phenotypes in same encounters (increase a)
a. Mass changes in law that favor the occupiers and disfavor the occupied (p. 25)
b. Support of Germanism rewarded in economic life (pp. 195, 206, 224)
2. Increase payoffs to aggressive phenotypes in cross encounters (increase b)
a. Mass changes in law that favor the occupiers and disfavor the occupied (p. 25)
b. Appropriation of property from occupied groups (pp. 37-40, 144)
c. Legal rights of occupied replaced by “grace” of occupant (p. 71)
d. Support of Germanism rewarded in economic life (pp. 195, 206, 224)
3. Decrease payoffs to peaceful phenotypes in cross encounters (decrease c)
a. Mass changes in law that favor the occupiers and disfavor the occupied (p. 25)
b. Appropriation of property from occupied groups (pp. 37-40)
c. Refuse unemployment relief for those unwilling to work for Germany (p. 69)
d. Legal rights of occupied replaced by “grace” of occupant (p. 71)
e. Severe penalties to those who help victim groups (p. 77)
f. Resistance to Germanism penalized in economic life (pp. 195, 206, 224)
4. Decrease payoffs to peaceful phenotypes in same encounters (decrease d)
a. Mass changes in law that favor the occupiers and disfavor the occupied (p. 25)
b. Disrupt centers of political resistance (p. 67)
c. Separate families (p. 67)
d. Exclude people from liberal arts education (pp. 84, 229)
e. Undermine religious affiliations and leadership in occupied territories(p. 89)
f. Create an atmosphere of moral debasement (pp. 89-90)
g. Appropriation of the gains from trade within occupied territories (pp. 127, 229)
h. Imprisonment or liquidation of key leaders (p. 139)
i. Resistance to Germanism penalized in economic life (pp. 195, 206, 224)
j. Assembly restricted (p. 231)
5. Increase initial ratio of aggressive phenotype in locales (increase )
a. Ideological penetration and fifth column support of Nazism (pp. 19, 83, 137, 237)
b. Mass deportations of native populations (pp. 21, 67)
c. Subsidies and tax breaks for German settlers in occupied territories (pp. 21, 63,
225)
d. Insertion of “colonization staffs” into occupied territories (p. 21)
e. Currency manipulation to finance insertion of aggressive types into areas (pp. 5153)
Notes
1. The parameters a, b, c, d, and are the parameters of the stage game for the basic model in Figure 1.
2. The page numbers in the table refer to pages in Raphael Lemkin’s (1944) Axis Rule in Occupied Europe.

